Research Overview

Broadly, I argue that reflecting on the functions of our moral concepts and practices, including their social and interpersonal functions, can often shed light on philosophical debates. I endorse this approach in my publications about blame, shame, and intellectual humility.

My dissertation project involves defending a pluralist, function-based account of blame. I argued that blame is defined in terms of a set of mutually reinforcing and jointly valuable functions, including protest, communication, and signaling.

Another main project concerns self-directed emotions like guilt, shame, and embarrassment. Philosophers often assume that, among these, only guilt counts as a moral emotion. I challenge this by defending the moral significance of shame and embarrassment.

I also have ongoing projects in epistemology, especially about the nature of intellectual humility and intellectual pride. I argue that both are intellectual virtues and can be useful ideals in education. I also argue that both have an often overlooked social dimension.